Action production and event perception as routine sequential behaviours by Cooper, Richard P.
BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online
Cooper, Richard P. (2019) Action production and event perception as routine




Please refer to usage guidelines at https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively
contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk.
OR I G I N A L A RT I C L E
Top i c : Even t P red i c t i ve Cogn i t i on




Richard P. Cooper, Centre for Cogni-
tion, Computation and Modelling, De-
partment of Psychological Sciences,
Birkbeck, University of London, Malet




This work was not funded through any
specific grant
It is argued that event perception and routine sequential
action production share a range of characteristics (e.g., sim-
ilar levels of automaticity, the involvement of sequentially
and hierarchically organised schemata, and the coupled op-
eration of predictive and monitoring processes). With this
in mind, and in an effort to develop a mechanistic account
of event perception, we consider how an existing model
of routine sequential action production might be applied in
the domain of event perception. We focus the discussion
on the multiple roles of prediction in the two domains, and
consider the implications of the application of the model of
action production to event perception, and for sequential
processing more generally.
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1 | INTRODUCTION: ON THE RELATION BETWEEN EVENTS AND ACTIONS
It has been convincingly argued that in order to make sense of the ever changing world we structure perceptual
experience in terms of events, drawing upon schematic or abstract knowledge of different types of events in order to
facilitate the process (Zacks and Tversky, 2001). Within this conception, an event is a coherent series of temporally
or causally connected interactions culminating in some agent-relevant regularity or goal, while an event schema is a
representation of the abstract shared features of a set of similar events. Through perception, sequences of simple or
atomic changes in the perceived world give rise to or activate an instance of an event schema, resulting in a mental
representation of an event that ties the perceptual changes into a coherent whole. It is this coherent whole that allows
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the perceiver to make sense of the ongoing sequences of changes in the perceived world.
Event schemata are central to the process of event perception. Like schemata in other domains such as long term
memory (Bartlett, 1932), motor control (Schmidt, 1975), and action control (Norman and Shallice, 1986), and as in
the domain-general schema-theory of Arbib (1992) (see also Cooper, 2016), event schemata are abstractions over
instances (in this case, instances of events) that capture functionally relevant regularities of those instances. Such
regularities include the generic subcomponents or basic actions of the event (sometimes referred to as “scenes”), the
sequential or temporal order of those subcomponents, and the culmination or goal of the event schema (Zacks and
Tversky, 2001). Hierarchical relations also exist both over the components of events / event schemata (partonomic
relations), and over types of event schemata (taxonomic relations). For example, a football game event will typically
include subcomponents such as a kick-off event at the beginning of each half, and a half-time event, while the football
game event is itself a specific kind of team field sporting event.
One key aspect of the sequential / temporal organisation of the components within event schemata is that it
allows them to support prediction and event segmentation. Prediction is supported because once a scene has been
identified as part of a known event schema, one may expect that subsequent scenes will correspond to subsequent
components of the schema. Event segmentation is supported because at the end of an event, uncertainty or prediction
error will be high (Kurby and Zacks, 2008).
A further property of event perception relevant to the current discussion is that it appears to be an automatic
process, proceeding with little overt attention or conscious control (Zacks and Swallow, 2007). That is, as an observer
we perceive a series of connected scenes as a coherent event. We cannot choose not to perceive the event.
In each of the above respects the domain of event perception parallels that of the production of routine sequen-
tial action. Many everyday activities involve the production of ordered sequences of basic actions, with those actions
forming partonomies within temporally extended behaviour (e.g., preparing a cup of tea being part of preparing break-
fast) and taxonomies with respect to more general types of action (e.g., preparing a cup of tea being a specific type
of beverage preparation schema). Moreover routine sequential action has been argued to be goal directed (Cooper
and Shallice, 2000) and automatic (Norman and Shallice, 1986). Finally, as argued below, the schematic nature of
the representations that support routine sequential action production (action schemata) may also support predictive
processing during action control / execution, which in turn allows error monitoring and proactive control in order to
avoid error.
In fact, sequential action production can be thought of as the inverse process of event perception. In the former
case, a desired goal or regularity is brought about through the performance of a sequence of basic acts (such as picking
up objects andmanipulating them in various object-specific ways, etc.), while in the latter an observed series of scenes
results (somehow) in inferences concerning the goal or culmination of the event and the causal relations between the
scenes. Indeed the abductive inference, from the perception of a scene to identification of the event schema to which
it (most likely) belongs, is necessary if that event schema is to support scene prediction and event segmentation.
In this paper we argue on the basis of the above parallels for overlap in the cognitive mechanisms that support
event perception and action production. We focus first on the domain of action, and one well-developed schema-
based account of the control of action, namely the dual-systems “Contention Scheduling / Supervisory System” ac-
count of Norman and Shallice (1986). We describe the theoretical account inmoderate detail, highlighting themultiple
roles of prediction within the theory. In particular, we a) review evidence for the use of prediction within the action
control domain, b) demonstrate how predictions can be used to detect and even pre-empt action errors, and c) sug-
gest how prediction, in the form of a forward model of our actions and intentions, fits within the broader cognitive
architecture. The implication of this argument is that the abstract representation of consequences is an integral part
of the mental representation of action knowledge, and that this applies at multiple levels (i.e., for complex action
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schemata comprising sequences of subschemata as well as for single basic acts). Extrapolating this to the perception
of events, it is argued that event schemata play a parallel role to action schemata, with perceptual experience and
current intentions triggering or activating action schemata (in the production of goal-directed sequential actions) and
event schemata (in the perception of experiences), and with subsequent processing (including prediction and monitor-
ing) in each domain being driven by those schemata that are most active. The work addresses the question of how, at
a mechanistic level, event perception might occur, namely, by essentially running the Contention Scheduling system
in reverse.
2 | A SCHEMA-BASED THEORY OF ACTION
2.1 | Contention Scheduling and the Supervisory System
In an influential theoretical account of the organisation and control of sequential action, Norman and Shallice (1986)
argued that routine or over-learned behaviour was the product of an automatic schema-based system. Within that
system, hierarchically organised action schemata were held to compete for selection and hence control of behaviour
through processes of interactive activation. Norman and Shallice (1986) referred to this system for the selection
of routine action schemata as Contention Scheduling (CS), and further argued that in situations where deliberate
or intentional control was exercised (e.g., non-routine situations, troubleshooting, etc.), the operation of Contention
Scheduling could be modulated by a second system, the Supervisory Attentional System (now commonly referred to
as the Supervisory System; SS). This second system was held to operate on behaviour only indirectly, by selective
excitation, or biasing, of schema representations within CS.
The Supervisory System is held to come into play in situations where no suitable schema exists within CS or where
deliberate attention to action is required. Through processes such as planning and strategy formation, SS attempts
to generate ordered sequences of known schemata so as to produce an intended outcome, temporarily maintains
such ordered sequences, and then selectively excites the schemata within CS in sequence so as to effect the plan or
strategy and produce an intended outcome. While the operation of these supervisory processes has not be addressed
in detail, SS is assumed to be the source of all intentional activation within the combined CS / SS architecture. Thus,
during a routine or everyday task, excitation of the appropriate highest-level node in CS is held to originate in SS. SS
is also held to be involved in monitoring the progress of on-going action towards a goal and the inhibition of selected
schemata when a mismatch between intention and action is detected (see Shallice and Burgess, 1996).
Support for the above theoretical account of action control comes from two primary sources: slips and lapses
in everyday or routine behaviour (as documented in the diary studies of Reason, 1979, 1984; Norman, 1981); and
errors in action (particularly goal-directed action) of neurological patients (see citations below). For example, the
schema-based nature of action is suggested by capture errors, where an intended action sequence is “captured” by
an unintended but over-learned routine (e.g., Norman, 1981, p. 8, cites a participant who reported that, after playing
cards and then counting pages coming out of a photocopier, “found myself counting 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, Jack,
Queen, King”), as well as by the so-called utilisation behaviour of certain neurological patients (e.g., Lhermitte, 1983;
Shallice et al., 1989; Boccardi et al., 2002), who appear unable to inhibit object-appropriate actions (such as pouring
water from a jug into a mug and drinking from the mug) when the objects are available in the immediate environment,
even when explicitly instructed not to use those objects.
A wealth of other data, relating primarily to slips and lapses in the routine behaviour of neurologically healthy
individuals (Reason, 1979, 1984; Norman, 1981), the more flagrant action errors of various groups of neurological
patients (including frontal patients: Luria 1966; Duncan 1986; Schwartz et al. 1991, 1998; left temporo-parietal pa-
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tients: De Renzi and Lucchelli 1988; Rumiati et al. 2001; and dementia patients: Giovannetti et al. 2002), and action
deficits relating to the rate of production in specific populations (Parkinson’s Disease patients: Jankovic 2008; and
those affected by drug-related amphetamine psychosis: Robbins and Sahakian 1983) also supports the theoretical
account.
2.2 | A Computational Model of Contention Scheduling
Cooper and Shallice (2000) developed the verbal account of the control of routine sequential action of Norman and
Shallice (1986) into a detailed computational model and demonstrated its potential within the relatively simple task of
preparing a cup of instant coffee— a 12 step task based on one component of the breakfast routine of the neurological
inpatients of Schwartz et al. (1991). The model was further developed by Cooper et al. (2005) to address a more
complex everyday task used by Schwartz et al. (1998) — preparing a packed lunch, comprising a sandwich, drink and
snack — and it is this latter implementation that we briefly describe here. Within this model, action schemata are
complex structures having the following components:
A goal, which is a state of the environment that will normally be achieved if the schema is executed.
A triggering condition, which specifies the conditions under which the representation of the perceived environment
excites the schema.
A (possibly empty) set of subgoal specifications, each element ofwhich is a triple consisting of a goal, a pre-condition
that must hold before attempting to achieve the goal, and a post-condition that should hold after successful
completion of the goal.
A (possibly empty) set of argument specifications, which specify argument roles for the schema and constraints (in
the form of features) on the kinds of things that might fill those roles.
An activation level, which is a scalar value ranging from zero to one. In the absence of any excitatory or inhibitory
input, activations tend to a resting level (of 0.1), but excitation may drive this towards the upper limit while
inhibition may drive it toward the lower limit.
A status, which is either selected or unselected. (Norman and Shallice, 1986, also allow schemata to be dormant.
Dormant schemata are assumed to be effectively “swapped out” of the schema selection process. They have no
associated activation level and hence do not to contribute to competitive selection processes, and are ignored
here.)
Following Norman and Shallice (1986), the model postulates that action schemata exist at multiple levels within
a hierarchy, and that when an action schema is activated above a threshold it is selected. Action schemata at the
lowest level, i.e., those with no subgoals, correspond to individual basic actions (e.g., picking up or putting down an
object, unscrewing a container, etc.). Selection of a schema at this level is assumed to result in performance of the
corresponding basic action. At higher levels, schemata correspond to sets of actions (or more accurately, subgoals).
Selection of a higher level schema results in excitation of those subschemata (i.e., those schemata that may achieve
one of the subgoals of the higher level schema) whose pre-conditions are met and whose post-conditions are not.
Activation therefore effectively flows in a top-down fashion from high-level schemata to low-level schemata. It is
assumed that the ultimate source of this activation is the Supervisory System which is held to activate the schema (or
schemata) corresponding to the current high-level intention (e.g., to prepare a cup of instant coffee).
Schemata also receive “bottom-up” excitation from the representation of the environment, with the degree of that
excitation depending on the salience of schema-relevant objects. Thus, a highly salient object which is within reach
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and of a size suitable for picking upwill excite the “pick-up” schema. These links between the schemata and object rep-
resentations are bi-directional. Consequently theymay create positive feedback loops between the two domains, such
that schemata excite appropriate object representations and object representations in turn excite object-appropriate
schemata.
If a schema has associated argument specifications, then when the schema is selected each of its arguments is
bound to the most salient object representation that meets the argument’s specification. Under normal functioning,
this and the positive feedback loops between schemata and object representations ensure that schemata and object
representations work in synchrony, but if the balance between top-down and bottom-up excitation is disturbed it is
possible for object-appropriate schemata to be selected in the absence of top-down intentional control (resulting in
the kind of utilisation behaviour produced by some neurological patients).
Within the model the activations of schemata and object representations are updated in a cyclic fashion, with all
activations also subject to a lateral inhibitory influence from competing entities (i.e., within the schema network, alter-
native schemata that might be attempted at the current point in time, and within the object representation network
alternative object representations that might fulfil a schema’s argument specification) and a self-excitatory influence
which partially counter-balances this lateral inhibition. Normally distributed random noise is also assumed to affect
all activations on each processing cycle. These three influences — lateral inhibition, self excitation, and noise — imple-
ment relatively standard processes of interactive activation and competition (McClelland, 1993), which ensure that,
at any point in time, no two competing items can be highly active, and moreover that with sufficient excitation from
top-down or bottom-up sources, exactly one item from each subset of competitors will tend to become highly active.
The model as described thus far is able to select a high-level schema, a schema for one of its subgoals, and so on
to the level of a basic action, and to apply that action with appropriate arguments. Pre-conditions and post-conditions
on a schema’s subgoals ensure actions are performed in an appropriate order. Thus, a schema for adding and stirring in
an ingredient during beverage preparation will include adding and stirring as separate subgoals, with a pre-condition
on stirring being that the ingredient has been added. Finally, selected schemata are inhibited when all post-conditions
of all of their subgoals are true. This inhibition results in deactivation (and subsequent deselection) of the selected
schema, allowing another schema to become selected, thus yielding a stream of action over time.
The complete model is able to generate appropriate sequences of actions for relatively complex behaviours (e.g.,
the lunch packing task of Schwartz et al., 1998). Flexibility in behaviour is supported by the use of pre-conditions
and post-conditions for regulating the flow of excitation within the schema network (which means that the order
of selection of subschemata is not fixed), while opportunistic behaviour (i.e., performing necessary actions when
environmentally appropriate) is supported by the bottom-up excitation of schemata. Moreover, when noise in the
interactive activation networks is relatively high themodel generates the kinds of slips and lapses seen in the behaviour
of neurologically healthy individuals when distracted, as described earlier, while with even greater noise or other
specific disturbances to activation flow (e.g., between networks) the model is able to reproduce various disorders of
action selection (Cooper and Shallice, 2000; Cooper et al., 2005; Cooper, 2007).
3 | PREDICTION AND INTERNAL MODELS IN THE CONTROL OF ACTION
Thus far we have not considered the multiple roles of prediction either within the control of action generally or within
the CS / SS theory more specifically. In general terms, and starting from the lowest (temporally least extended) level,
prediction has been argued to be essential for the control of rapid sequential action, where motor commands compat-
ible with future states must be generated in advance by the cognitive system (e.g. Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000).
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At a slightly higher level, within CS / SS theory the post-conditions of a schema’s subschemata are predictions of the
state of the local environment after completion of that subschema. As argued below, these predictions have the po-
tential to support error detection and to thereby trigger error recovery processes. A third role of prediction relates to
goal representations associated within schemata. A schema’s goal is a representation of both a desired state of affairs
associated with the schema and an explicit prediction of the consequences of successful performance of the schema.
Higher-level planning processes, assumed to be within the realm of SS, operate over such goal representations in
order to generate temporary schemata for the control of non-routine behaviours.
The CS / SS theory provides a framework for formalising these three roles of prediction within sequential ac-
tion selection and for subsequently specifying them in mechanistic terms. In this section we focus specifically on
schema post-conditions and how those post-conditions define a “forward model” — a model of anticipated action
consequences that may serve to mitigate error. In the following section we consider how, in an inverted form of the
contention scheduling model, such forward models might support perceptual processes of event segmentation.
3.1 | Internal Models in Motor Control
Consider the coordination of rapid fine-grained sequential motor behaviour, such as when serving a tennis ball, play-
ing a musical instrument, or even when typing quickly at a keyboard. These skilled behaviours require that motor
commands for upcoming movements be programmed before the preceding movement is complete. Wolpert and
Ghahramani (2000) argue that in such cases, the state of the motor system when a subsequent motor command is to
be performed must be estimated or predicted, and that this is achieved through the use of several “internal models”.
Specifically, it is argued that the motor system makes use of:
• a “forward dynamicmodel”, to predict the expected state of the external environment, on the basis of the previous
state, the current motor command, and contextual information;
• a “forward sensory model”, to predict the expected sensory feedback of a motor command, on the basis of the
expected state, the actual motor command, and the context; and
• an “inverse model”, to predict the motor command required to achieve a given state, given the current task and
context.
Thesemodels are held to underlie all motor control (i.e., not just fast fine-grainedmotor control). Moreover themodels
are held to feed into each other, with the output of the forward dynamicmodel feeding into the forward sensorymodel,
the output of the forward sensory model feeding into the inverse model, and the output of the inverse model feeding
into the forward dynamic model. The arguments for this sequential cyclic operation are arguably largely aesthetic,
however, and an alternative arrangement where the forward models operate in parallel would also seem feasible (i.e.,
where the state, motor command, and context generate both the anticipated state and sensory feedback in parallel).
To illustrate the three models, Wolpert and Ghahramani (2000) give the example of picking up a milk carton that is
thought to be full (and hence heavy). The inverse model allows programming of appropriate reach, grasp and lift motor
commands, while the forward dynamic model predicts the consequent state and the forward sensory model predicts
the anticipated sensory feedback given that state. If the carton happens to be empty, then this will be apparent from
error between the output of the forwardmodels and sensory (visual and proprioceptive) feedback— i.e., the prediction
error — which may be used for the on-line adjustment of motor behaviour.
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F IGURE 1 The effect of monitoring and intervention based on prediction failure on the errors produced by the
Contention Scheduling model of Cooper et al. (2005) when completing a battery of five multiple object tests.
3.2 | Post-Conditions and Forward Models in Contention Scheduling
CS operates at a temporal level above that considered by Wolpert and Ghahramani (2000), and as such the schedul-
ing of schemata does not directly rely on internal models. However, the post-conditions of a schema’s subgoals may
support monitoring of action outcomes and hence error detection and subsequent correction in a way analogous to
motor control. Monitoring based on the checking of post-conditions was included in the implementation of CS de-
scribed by Cooper et al. (2005), but a systematic investigation of its effects was not reported. Therefore, in order to
investigate the role of prediction, post-conditions and monitoring, we here report the results of a novel set of simula-
tions. The model of Cooper et al. (2005) was run on a battery of five multiple object tasks that have previously been
used to evaluate the model’s behaviour following damage (see Cooper, 2007) with the monitoring/error correction
mechanism enabled or disabled (1000 times in each condition), as the level (i.e., standard deviation) of global noise
was increased from 0.01 to 0.25. Global noise has previously been argued to simulate a generalised deficit in sequen-
tial goal-directed action selection as seen in Action Disorganisation Syndrome. Means and standard deviations were
obtained for the number of interventions (in the monitoring / error correction condition) and both the numbers of ac-
tions and the numbers of each type of error at each level of noise (in both conditions). Figure 1 provides a comparison
of the results across the two conditions.
As shown in the figure, when the error monitoring mechanism is disabled (the “Int−” conditions in the figure),
the model produces errors when noise is greater than approximately 0.05. The number of errors (and the number
of actions performed) on each task within the battery increases steadily as the level of noise increases. When error
monitoring and correction is enabled (the “Int+” conditions in the figure), interventions occur and act to limit errors.
Errors still occur, particularly at high levels of noise, but atmuch lower rates. Atmoderate levels of noise (between 0.10
and 0.20) the mechanism suppresses all types of sequence errors (i.e., errors involving the misordering of lower-level
actions). Within this range, the basic model is also susceptible to so-called conceptual errors (e.g., misusing objects or
performing actions at the wrong location). Again, the mechanism for intervening on post-condition failure suppresses
these errors, though to a lesser extent than for sequential errors.
It must be emphasised that the interventionmechanismoperates only after prediction failure occurs. The recovery
mechanism, which in this implementation does little more than try the failed schema again, effectively puts the system
back on track, and it is this that prevents error (i.e., the errors produced by the model without interventions are
produced subsequent to post-condition failure, they do not reflect behaviour occurring during the faulty execution of
a sub-schema leading to that failure). Prediction within the model thus serves as an effective mechanism for detecting
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F IGURE 2 The Executive SubProcess (ESPro) framework, adapted from Sood and Cooper (2013). Oblong shaped
boxes represent information storage subsystems (buffers). Hexagonal boxes represent process that operate on
information stored in buffers (e.g., by transforming it or reactivating it). The rectangular box is a complex process
assumed to have internal structure. Blunt-ended arrows represent information read relations between processes
and buffers. Sharp-ended arrows represent information write or send operations that might originate from
processes. All processes are assumed to function in parallel.
3.3 | Forward Models and Prediction in the ESPro Framework
One question arising from the view of action control as presented here concerns the placement of monitoring within
the broader CS / SS theory. One possibility is provided by the Executive SubProcess (ESPro: Sexton and Cooper,
2014; Sood and Cooper, 2013) framework depicted in Figure 2. The figure shows how key functional cognitive com-
ponents of the CS / SS theory might interact in the generation and regulation of action (and sequential cognition more
generally).
Consider first the operation of those components that make up Contention Scheduling. Within the framework,
perceptual input is transformed, via the process of Perception, into a representation that enters Sensory Stores. This
representation is assumed to encode the objects available in the immediate perceptual environment and their action-
relevant features. If a task-set, or more specifically a schema for mapping sensory inputs to potential responses, is
selected (within Schema Hierarchy), then Apply Set uses this to generate a potential response which is copied or stored
in Response Buffer. A further process, Generate Response, executes the corresponding motor commands. At the same
time it updates Forward Model, which contains a representation of the anticipated perceptual state(s). Within the
framework, schemata (with their activation values) are contained within Schema Hierarchy, and Attentivenessworks to
maintain schema activation and regulate competition.
Supervisory processes operate to modulate the functioning of those components described in the previous para-
graph. For example, if no schema is sufficiently active so as to exceed the schema selection threshold, then General
Problem Solving is assumed to apply problem solving heuristics to generate a plan or strategy for the current goal
(which is assumed to be accessible within Working Memory), and to produce top-down excitation of an appropriate
schema within Schema Hierarchy (leading to selection of that schema). At the same time, Monitoring compares the
contents of Sensory Stores and Forward Model, inhibiting the currently selected schema (in Schema Hierarchy) if the
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two are found to be inconsistent, thereby forcing schema deselection and triggering General Problem Solving.
At the time of writing ESPro is more of a generalised framework than a fully-functioning architecture. It has been
applied to some standard tasks from the executive function literature, including theWisconsin Card Sorting Test (Sood
and Cooper, 2013) and random number generation (Sexton and Cooper, 2014), both of which tax putative functions
such as task setting, response inhibition, and working memory updating, but modelling those tasks has not taxed the
Forward Model component. Nevertheless, it provides a sketch of the relation between the Forward Model and other
components of the cognitive system. Thus, with respect to action schemata as conceptualised above, when a schema
(at any level) is applied (by Apply Set), Response Buffer should contain not just the response to be generated but also
the schema’s post-conditions, which are applied by the Generate Response process to update the Forward Model.
The proposed location of the Forward Model within the framework reflects in part the claim that the model op-
erates with higher level content than the forward models of Wolpert and Ghahramani (2000) proposed within the
motor control literature. That is, it contains predicted or anticipated consequences of both lower-level schemata
(corresponding to the basic actions described in section 2.2), as well as those of their superordinate schemata (at in-
creasing levels of temporal grain). The justification for this higher level content with the forward model comes in part
from the robustness that it provides to the action selection system, as shown by the simulations in section 3.2, and
in part from the phenomenology of slip detection (as evidenced by diary reports of catching slips even before they
occur, e.g., Norman, 1981, p 12).
Moreover the hierarchical nature of schemata means that the ForwardModel does not just project one action step
forward in time. That is, it does not simply represent the post-conditions of the current low-level schema, but also
the post-conditions of its super-ordinate schemata (and all the way up the schema hierarchy). Thus, the predictions
contained within the Forward Model must include both perceptual / sensory and temporal specifications. Monitoring
cannot just compare immediate perceptual / sensory input with anticipated perceptual / sensory input, it must also
compare the post-conditions of all selected subschemata with anticipations from their ancestors at the given time.
This kind of projecting forward in time is needed to catch errors in the act or before they occur and to allow, in the
prescient words of (Luria, 1966, p. 238), “the process of comparison of intention and effect”.
3.4 | Three Further Roles of Prediction in the Control of Action
While space limitations prevent a full treatment, it should be noted that there are additional potential roles of predic-
tion in action control that have not been considered here. One concerns the setting of cognitive control parameters
(e.g., within a theory such as the Executive Control Theory of Visual Attention; Logan and Gordon, 2001) when switch-
ing tasks. Consider a naïve participant approaching a colour naming Stroop trial, for example. Having had the task
explained, the participant must engage sufficient attention to the colour naming task (which in current models, e.g.,
Cohen et al., 1990, amounts to setting an appropriate bias to the colour naming pathway). This requires predicting how
much attentional bias to colour namingwill be sufficient to over-ride theword reading response. Typically, participants
will err on the first trial. On this account such errors are due to a poor prediction based on insufficient experience
with Stroop stimuli. This prediction is rapidly adjusted following experience such that participants are quickly able to
perform the colour naming task without error, provided that strong attentional bias to the task is maintained.
A second role of prediction is evident in the Goal Circuit model of Cooper et al. (2014), which combines aspects
of the action control models of Botvinick and Plaut (2004) and Cooper and Shallice (2000). This model uses a simple
recurrent network to predict subsequent subgoals within the currently selected schema. As in the work described
above, this opens the possibility for anticipatory error correction (when predicted subgoals are not intended subgoals).
Such subgoals may also be modulated by higher order control (i.e., the SS) before being fed back into the model
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(through the goal circuit), making the model capable of using known schemata to perform novel task variants (e.g.,
preparing coffee with extra measures of sugar).
Finally, prediction has an important role in higher-level planning. While we assume that such planning is the
product of General Problem Solving, it would equally appear to involve projecting the current state forward in time
based on application of a sequence of potential schemata. That is, it would appear to also involve construction of a
forward model, but one representing a hypothetical state. Hence, this projection of the current state is presumably
deliberately represented inWorkingMemory rather than automatically representedwithin ForwardModel, as is required
to enable Monitoring during the execution of routine behaviour. Note also that this account assumes that General
Problem Solving is able to reason over the abstract goal representations associated with those schemata known to
Contention Scheduling.
4 | EVENT PERCEPTION AS ROUTINE SEQUENTIAL PROCESSING
We began by arguing for similarities between event perception and routine sequential action production. The dis-
cussion of the previous two sections – of the Contention Scheduling model of routine sequential action production
and the roles of prediction within that (and related) models – might have seemed a detour. However, the Contention
Scheduling model is not just a model of routine sequential action production. Rather, it is a model of hierarchical
schema-based sequential processing, where schemata can be triggered or activated by both intentional / top-down
and environmental / bottom-up sources, and as argued, event perception is guided by hierarchically structured event
schemata.
Figure 3 outlines how activation, selection and prediction in themodel operate in the case of action schemata (left)
and how it might be applied in the case of event perception (right). The outline focusses on the most critical aspects of
the model for the two cases. Note though that bottom-up excitation of schemata (as depicted in the event perception
model) has always been a feature of the action selection model, where it plays an important role in the explanation
of capture errors and utilisation behaviour. Thus, it is not an additional component of the model, though the balance
between bottom-up and top-down excitation might be tilted more toward bottom-up sources in the case of event
perception and top-down sources in the case of action selection. Note also that in the case of event perception,
multiple lower-level scenes may be required to uniquely identify a single event schema at each superordinate level.
Thus, from a mathematical perspective, bottom-up excitation might be conceived of as determining a probability
distribution over higher-level event schemata. (Similarly, top-down excitation of an action schema can be conceived
of as determining a probability distribution over lower-level actions.)
This account of event processing clarifies the sense in which event perception and action production are inverse
processes. It suggests that while action production is (generally) the product of top-down, intentionally driven, excita-
tion within a hierarchically organised schema network, event perception is the product of bottom-up, environmentally
(or perceptually) driven, excitation within the same network. Both processes generate forward models, which consti-
tute predictions of future states, and both processes are subject to bias or error due to excitation working against
the desired flow – bottom-up excitation of action schemata leads to potential utilisation (and other) errors, while
top-down excitation of event schemata leads to potential mis-interpretation of events.
Moreover, the account has much in common with several other views that emphasise the roles of action, sensori-
motor contingencies, and ideomotor principles in cognition. In the Theory of Event Coding (see in particular Hommel,
2004, 2015), for example, a common code (so-called event codes) represents both perceptual events and planned
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F IGURE 3 Schematic representation of activation flow, schema selection, and prediction in (left) the Contention
Scheduling model of routine action selection and (right) the proposed application of the model to event perception.
All schema nodes also receive bottom-up excitation in proportion to the degree to which their preconditions match
the current state of the perceived environment.
and Bressler (2012). The proposal is also consistent with evidence provided by Flanagan and Johansson (2003), who
showed that when participants observed an agent performing a simple sequential task, the participants’ gaze was
predictive of the next action, rather than reactive (i.e., following the current action). Predictive gaze is a known char-
acteristic of routine sequential action, where visual attention is often focussed on the next action, rather than the
current one (Land et al., 1999), suggesting that action execution and event perception (as required in the case of ob-
servation) share fundamental processes or representations. This evidence is moreover consistent with both the mirror
neuron literature (e.g., Gallese and Goldman, 1998) and studies of imitation and action observation (e.g., Brass et al.,
2001; Hamilton and Grafton, 2006), which suggest that observing others act might activate the neural and cognitive
representations of actions and their goals.
The above is not to deny that in some cases there are clear differences between actions and events (e.g., in
perspective: typically third person/observer versus necessarily first person/actor; in scope: events are more general
in that we perceive events that do not have or require an actor; and in the role of agents: which for action is implicit
but which for those events with an actor must be explicit). These differences warrant further consideration, and
modifications to the existing model may be required to accommodate them.
5 | CONCLUSION
We have reviewed the role of prediction in the generation of goal-directed sequential action, and argued that it may
serve roles at a range of levels, from setting cognitive control parameters to allowing monitoring of temporally ex-
tended schemata and the detection and capture of likely action errors before they are even produced. Insight into the
mechanisms of event perception came from the Contention Scheduling / Supervisory System account of the control
of action. The CS / SS account suggests that event schemata may be no different in kind from action schemata. They
may simply be schemata that allow us to interpret sensory input. Thus, while action schemata may result in the gen-
eration of motor commands and higher-level action plans, event schemata may result in the generation of working
memory or otherwise cognitive representations of the sensory input.
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